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This study examined whether negative interpretations of bodily sensations result in a 
memory bias for such sensations under conditions of social evaluation.  Undergraduate students 
(N = 77) were connected to equipment which they were told would measure their physiology and 
were trained on how to monitor their physiology via computer feedback as they gave a video-
taped speech.  Approximately half of participants (n = 41) were told that their physiological 
feedback provides important information about their performance, and those remaining (n = 36) 
were told that their physiological feedback is unrelated to their performance.  Participants were 
subsequently given free recall and recognition tests for the computer feedback.  Results suggest 
that believing physiological feedback is related to quality of performance resulted in enhanced 
memory for all information about bodily sensations.  Furthermore, heightened social anxiety was 
associated with enhanced processing of stimuli associated with increasing physiology whereas 
lower social anxiety was associated with enhanced processing of stimuli associated with stable 
physiology when the belief that physiological feedback provides important information about 
performance is activated.  Results are discussed in relation to cognitive behavioural models of 
social anxiety. 
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Interpretation of and memory for bodily sensations during public speaking 
1. Introduction 
Self-focused attention refers to the process of directing attention towards internal 
information, such as thoughts, beliefs, and/or bodily sensations.  According to Duval and 
Wicklund (1972) and Carver and Scheier (1981), directing attention towards the self serves to 
aid the individual in evaluating his/her behaviour.  Fenigstein (1979) further distinguished 
between the tendency to attend towards aspects of the public self (e.g., how other people 
perceive oneself), referred to as public self-consciousness, and the tendency to attend towards 
private aspects of the self (e.g., personal thoughts feelings, and sensations), referred to as private 
self-consciousness. 
Current cognitive models implicate self-focused attention in the maintenance of social 
anxiety (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).  In these models, individuals with 
social anxiety are proposed to form a mental representation of how they believe the audience 
perceives them.  The bodily sensations that accompany anxiety are thought to play a particularly 
important role in the formation of this mental representation.   
There is much evidence supporting these cognitive models. High levels of self-focused 
attention appear to result in stronger response to rejection (Fenigstein, 1979), and reduced 
memory accuracy for external social information (e.g., names, characteristics of a conversation 
partner) (Kimble, Hirt, & Arnold, 1985; Kimble & Zehr, 1982).  Additionally, individuals with 
social anxiety disorder (SAD) have been found to score higher on measures of public self-
consciousness (Hope & Heimberg, 1988; Jostes, Pook, & Florin, 1999; Lundh & Ost, 1996b; 
Saboonchi, Lundh, & Ost, 1999) and in some instances also on private self-consciousnesss 
(Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, & Dombeck, 1990; Jostes et al., 1999) compared to individuals 
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without SAD.  Furthermore, individuals with high levels of social anxiety have been found to 
preferentially attend to cues of internal arousal rather than cues of external social threat, whereas 
no such difference has been found for non-anxious individuals (Mansell, Clark, & Ehlers, 2003; 
Pineles & Mineka, 2005).  Experimentally inducing self-focused attention in individuals with 
SAD results in enhanced concern over the impression they leave, increased social withdrawal 
(Alden, Teschuk, & Tee, 1992), and increased anxiety (Woody, 1996; Woody & Rodriguez, 
2000).  In contrast, instructions to attend externally during exposure have been found to result in 
greater reductions in within-situation anxiety and believability of feared consequences as 
compared to exposure alone among individuals with SAD (Wells & Papageorgiou, 1998). 
Individuals with high levels of social anxiety also appear to also be more likely to 
interpret increased physiological response negatively.  Arntz, Rauner, and van den Hout (1995) 
found that individuals with SAD are more likely to report an anxiety response to vignettes in 
which physiological symptoms of anxiety are apparent.  In contrast, individuals without an 
anxiety disorder report an anxiety response only to vignettes in which actual danger is present.  
Roth, Antony, and Swinson (2001) found that individuals with SAD believe that others interpret 
observable symptoms of anxiety as being indicative of anxiety or a psychiatric condition and are 
less likely to interpret these symptoms as being a normal physical state compared to non-anxious 
participants.  In another study, compared to non-anxious participants, individuals with SAD 
showed greater increases in anxiety and worry over their heart rate under conditions in which 
observers could hear the participant’s heart rate compared to when only the participant could 
hear his/her heart rate (Gerlach, Mourlane, & Rist, 2004).  These findings suggest that SAD 
concerns over physiological sensations may be related beliefs about the meaning of bodily 
sensations.  Though, it should be noted that some studies have found that all individuals, 
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regardless of the level of social anxiety exhibit increased anxiety and negative performance 
evaluation in response to false-feedback about increase arousal (Wild, Clark, Ehlers, & 
McManus, 2008). 
This heightened awareness of internal physiological sensations may not be limited to just 
attentive and interpretation biases in social anxiety.  In at least two studies, Hackmann and 
colleagues have found that most individuals with SAD report having recurrent images of social 
situations and that many of these images are linked to memories of early social events 
(Hackmann, Clark, & McManus, 2000).  Importantly for this discussion, one of the main sensory 
modalities of these images and memories was bodily sensations, and several of the themes of 
these images and memories included fear of others noticing symptoms of anxiety, such as 
sweating or blushing (Hackmann et al., 2000; Hackmann, Surawy, & Clark., 1998). 
Though memory biases for social threat information are predicted by cognitive models of 
social anxiety (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997), these studies assessing 
autobiographical memories of individuals with SAD (Hackmann et al., 2000; Hackmann et al., 
1998) are among the few to find evidence for a memory bias for negative social evaluative 
information.  Researchers have generally been unsuccessful in demonstrating that social anxiety 
is associated with a memory bias for social threat words (Cloitre, Cancienne, Heimberg, Holt, & 
Liebowitz, 1995; Foa, McNally, & Murdock, 1989; Rapee, McCallum, Melville, Ravenscroft, & 
Rodney, 1994), vignettes (Brendle & Wenzel, 2004; Wenzel, Finstrom, Jordan, & Brendle, 2005; 
Wenzel & Holt, 2002), or faces (Lundh & Ost, 1996a; Perez-Lopez & Woody, 2001).   
 One explanation as to why researchers have had difficulty detecting a memory bias in 
social anxiety may be due to the fact that attention is directed towards the self rather than 
towards external sources of threat.  Studies assessing attention towards, and the meaning of, 
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internal arousal (Clark et al., 2003; Artnz et al., 1994; Pineles & Mineka, 2005; Roth et al., 2001) 
suggest that one important source of threat may be internal information.  What individuals with 
social anxiety may have a better memory for is the information that is the source of their self-
focused attention: their thoughts, feelings, and bodily sensations.  In fact, the few studies that 
have found evidence of a memory bias have found it for negative public self-referent information 
(e.g., thoughts about how other people perceive the self) (Mansell & Clark, 1999; O'Banion & 
Arkowitz, 1977; Smith, Ingram, & Brehm, 1983).  To the best of our knowledge no study has yet 
to examine whether individuals with social anxiety also exhibit a memory bias for another source 
of self-focus, internal sensations of physiological arousal. 
 Using a false physiology feedback paradigm, this study examined whether attaching 
importance to the meaning of bodily sensations during a performance task would result in a 
memory bias for cues consistent with those bodily sensations.  Participants were asked to give a 
speech while monitoring their physiological response on a computer monitor.  Participants were 
subsequently asked to recall and recognize stimuli that were associated with increases, decreases, 
and stability in their physiological response during their speech.  Half the participants were told 
that changes in their physiology were indicative of a poor performance; whereas the remaining 
participants were told that changes in their physiology were unrelated to their performance.   
 We hypothesized that interpreting changes in physiological arousal as being important 
would result in enhanced memory consistent with those beliefs (e.g., better memory stimuli 
associated with increasing and decreasing physiological changes).  Because cognitive models of 
social anxiety (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) and research (Mansell & Clark, 
1999; Roth et al., 2001; Wells & Papageorgiou, 2001) suggest that such interpretations are 
common among individuals with social anxiety we also predicted that memory for stimuli 
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indicative of changing and decreasing physiology would be most enhanced among the 
individuals with high social anxiety who were told that changes in their physiological arousal are 
important indicators of performance.  That is, a three-way interaction between social anxiety, 
beliefs about the importance of physiological feedback, and type of feedback was predicted, such that 
the difference in memory for stimuli indicative of changing physiology between high and low 
socially anxious participants would vary as a factor of the degree to which they believed that changes 
in physiology were an important predictor of performance. 
2. Method 
2.1 Participants 
 Participants were 114 undergraduate students recruited from psychology classes at 
Concordia University, Montreal, Canada.  Students received either $10, had their name entered 
in a draw for cash prizes or received partial credit towards their classes in exchange for 
participating.  Half the participants were assigned to a high-importance condition (n = 57) and 
the remaining participants were assigned to a low-importance condition (n = 57) (see below for 
more information).  Participants were excluded from the study if they did not attend both visits 
(n = 1), if they reported being diagnosed with panic disorder (n = 2), if they did not at all believe 
that the computer was measuring their physiology (n = 1), or if they indicated that they did not 
know the name for some of the images that they saw (n = 28) (see section 2.3 for a description of 
how the last two exclusionary criteria were assessed).  One additional participant was excluded 
because they did not comply with instructions and 2 participants were also excluded due to 
experimenter error.  Of the remaining participants, 42 were in the high-importance condition and 
37 were in the low-importance condition.   
 To examine the relationship between social anxiety and memory for internal information 
participants were divided into high social anxiety (HSA; n = 39) and low social anxiety (LSA; n 
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= 40) groups based on a median split on the Social Phobia Scale (SPS; Mattick & Clarke, 1998).  
A median split, rather than the clinical cut off, was used as it enabled us to create groups of 
similar size for comparison purposes.1  
A condition by social anxiety group ANOVA found no significant difference in age 
between participants in the two conditions, F (1, 75) = 2.39, p = .13, or the social anxiety groups, 
F (1, 75) = 2.59, p = .11, however the interaction between condition and social anxiety group 
approached significance, F (1, 75) = 3.39, p = .07,  η2 = .04.  Analysis of outliers revealed two 
participants, ages 41 and 53 years, who were much older than other participants.  Both 
participants were in the HSA low-importance group.  After removing these two participants the 
interaction between condition and social anxiety group no longer approached significance, F (1, 
73) = 2.28, p = .14.  These participants were therefore eliminated from subsequent analyses.  Of 
the remaining participants, there were no significant differences in distribution for sex, χ2 (3) = 
2.56, p = .46, or level of education, χ2 (9) = 12.52, p = .19.  Table 1 displays the average age of 
participants after removal of outliers, as well as the sex distribution and highest level of 
education attained.  In the final sample analyzed in the high-importance condition 17 participants 
were in the HSA group and 22 were in the LSA group and in the low-importance condition 23 
participants were in the HSA group and 15 were in the LSA group. 
2.2 Measures 
Social Phobia Scale (SPS) and Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS) (Mattick & 
Clarke, 1998).  The SPS and SIAS are 20-item self-report questionnaires.  The SPS assesses fear 
                                                 
1 Analyses were also run using Moderated Multiple Regression (MMR) which allows for the analyses of categorical 
and dimensional variables together.  The disadvantage of MMR is that within participant variables (e.g., stimulus 
type [increasing, decreasing, stable]) cannot be entered into a single regression and thus separate regression must be 
calculated for each stimulus type for each memory measure (e.g., recognition and recall).  As results did not 
significantly differ depending on whether social anxiety was analyzed categorically or dimensionally, we only report 
the categorical data here. 
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of being observed by others whereas the SIAS assesses social interaction anxiety.  Scores greater 
than 24 on the SPS and greater than 34 on the SIAS are suggestive of SAD (Heimberg, Mueller, 
Holt, Hope, & Liebowitz, 1992).  The scale has demonstrated excellent reliability and validity in 
a non-clinical sample (Osman, Gutierrez, Barrios, Kopper, & Chiros, 1998).  The SPS was used 
to divide groups into high and low social anxiety because it assesses fears most relevant to the 
public speaking task in this experiment. 
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996).  The BDI-II is a 21-
item self report questionnaire assessing symptoms of depression.  Among non-clinical samples, it 
has demonstrated excellent reliability and validity (Carmody, 2005; Dozois, Dobson, & 
Ahnberg, 1998; Osman, Downs et al., 1997; Wiebe & Penley, 2005).  
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988).  The BAI is a 21-
item self report questionnaire assessing somatic and cognitive symptoms of anxiety.  The scale 
has demonstrated excellent reliability and validity in non-clinical samples (Creamer, Foran, & 
Bell, 1995; Osman, Kopper, Barrios, Osman, & Wade, 1997). 
State anxiety.  At the beginning, just prior to, and just after giving the speech, participants 
were asked to rate how happy, angry, anxious, and depressed they were feeling using 100mm 
visual analog scales (VAS) anchored by “I do not feel at all X” at 0 and “I feel extremely X” at 
100.  The rating of anxiety was used as a measure of state anxiety.  The remaining variables were 
simply filler items and therefore were not analyzed.  
2.3 Integrity Check 
 Using 100mm VASs participants were asked “Did you believe that the computer was 
measuring your physiology?”  Low scores indicate that they believed the computer was 
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measuring their physiology and high scores indicate that they did not believe the computer was 
measuring their physiology. 
 To ensure that participants had conceptual knowledge of the image stimuli participants 
were asked at the end of the study if there were any images for which they did not know the 
name.  Any participants who indicated that they did not know the name of some of the images 
was excluded from analyses because it was felt that absence of conceptual knowledge of image 
stimuli may adversely influence free recall and visual recognition of items.2  
2.4 Image Stimuli 
Stimuli were photographic images of animals, fruits and vegetables, and man-made 
objects that participants were told indicated that their physiology was increasing, decreasing, or 
stable.  The meaning of each category was counterbalanced across participants (e.g., some 
participants were told that animal images indicate increasing physiology, whereas others were 
told that fruit or vegetable images indicate increasing physiology, and others were told that man-
made object images indicate increasing physiology).  Images were selected from Microsoft 
Office clip art and via searches on the internet.  Stimuli were centered on the screen with a solid 
background.  Images were 10 cm wide.  Height varied depending on the photograph itself.  
Participants saw 20 images from each category; 5 images during the training phase, 10 images 
during the speech task; and 5 images as lures for the recognition test.  Each image appeared on 
the screen for 5 seconds and was preceded by a 1 second blank screen. 
2.5 Procedure 
2.5.1 Physiology monitoring training. 
                                                 
2 Analyses were rerun including participants who indicated that they did not know the name of all images.  Though 
the pattern of results remained the same, some main effects and simple effects of the three-way interaction were 
reduced to the  trend level.  This appeared to result from the fact that participants who reported not knowing the 
names of some images substantially contributed to the level of variability within the sample. 
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 The experiment took place in front of a computer.  Participants were seated and then 
connected to equipment they were led to believe would be measuring their physiology.  
However, at no point in the study was their physiology measured.  TD-142G vinyl disposable 
electrodes were attached to the inside of each elbow, and a Velcro electrode cuff was attached to 
the left index finger of each participants.  Participants were told that these would measure 
fluctuations in heart rate and sweating respectively.  A Panasonic video camera was mounted on 
top of the computer monitor, and a computer microphone was placed just to the left of the 
computer monitor.  Participants were told that these would respectively measure awkward, 
abrupt movements and voice quality.  Finally, a webcam was attached to the video camera.  
Participants were led to believe that it was an infra-red camera, which measured how much heat 
they were emitting, an indicator of blushing.   
Participants were asked to give a video-taped speech, which they were led to believe 
would be evaluated by a psychologist at a later date.  They were told that during the speech they 
would be provided with feedback from the computer on whether their physiology was increasing, 
decreasing or stable and were instructed on the type of feedback they would get for each type of 
physiological response.  Participants then completed a practice trial to familiarize themselves 
with how to monitor their physiology.  They were first asked to sit quietly for 30 seconds, then to 
jog on the spot for 30 seconds to increase physiology, and then to sit quietly for 30 seconds to 
decrease physiology.  During each 30 second period participants were asked to observe the 
screen to see what happens when their physiology changes. For each practice trial participants 
saw 4 images that were consistent with the anticipated type of physiological response and to 
increase the believability of the task one image that was inconsistent with the anticipated type of 
physiological response. 
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2.5.2 Importance manipulation.  Approximately half of participants were randomly 
assigned to a high-importance condition.  They were told that if they give a successful speech, 
their physiology would remain fairly stable and therefore, they should expect to see mostly 
images indicative of stable physiology.  The remaining participants were assigned to a low-
importance condition, and were told that if they give a successful speech, their physiology would 
be likely to change but it does not reflect the quality of their performance, and therefore they 
should expect to see no particular pattern of images from the three categories on the screen.   
 2.5.3 Speech.  Participants were then asked to choose a topic from a list of neutral topics 
(e.g, Discuss the pros and cons of downloading pirated music off the internet versus purchasing 
the real thing at the record store), and were given 3-minutes to prepare their speech. 
 At the end of 3-minutes to increase the impact of the importance manipulation the 
experimenter informed participants that the expert evaluating their speech would be given a copy 
of their physiological responses.  Those in the high-importance condition were told that the 
expert would take this into account when evaluating their speech.  Participants in the low-
importance condition were told that the experimenter “couldn’t imagine why the expert would 
use that information when evaluating their speech”. 
 To enhance focus on the images on the computer monitor, the experimenter turned off the 
overhead light and turned on a desk lamp that was directed towards the participant.  The 
experimenter then left the room while participants completed their 3-minute speech. 
 During the speech participants saw 30 images, 10 indicative of increasing, 10 of 
decreasing, and 10 of stable physiology.  The order of the images was pseudo random to ensure 
that images from the same category would not appear more than twice in a row. 
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2.5.4 Distractor task.  After completing the speech participants were taken to a separate 
room and given a 3-minute distractor task which consisted of completing a word search puzzle of 
names. 
2.5.5 Free recall.  Participants then returned to the room in which they gave the speech 
and were asked to write down as many of the images that they saw during their speech that they 
could remember.  Participants were given 3-minutes to complete this task.  At the end of 3-
minutes the experimenter queried participants on any items that were unclear (e.g., If they wrote 
bear, the experimenter asked them to either say what kind of bear or to describe the bear to 
determine if they remembered seeing a polar bear). 
 2.5.6 Recognition.  Participants were then were shown 30 images on the computer screen, 
15 of which were ‘old’ images from the original speech (e.g., there were 5 each from the images 
associated with increasing, decreasing, and stable physiology) and 15 of which were ‘new’ 
images that they had not seen previously during the experiment.  Participants were asked to 
indicate which pictures they had seen during the speech and which pictures were new.  No more 
than two pictures in a row were from the same image category, and no more than two pictures in 
a row were both old or both new.   
 2.5.7 Questionnaires.  After completing the recognition task, participants were then asked 
to complete a questionnaire package that included the questionnaires listed above. 
2.6 Statistical Analyses 
 The percentages of correctly recalled items representing increasing, decreasing, and 
stable physiology were calculated.  For recognition, the hit rate and false alarm rate were 
calculated for each stimulus type.  Because hit and false alarm rates do not differentiate between 
sensitivity (e.g., the ability to distinguish between “old” and “new” items) and response bias 
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(e.g., the tendency to respond “old” or “new”), signal detection theory (SDT) was used to tease 
apart these factors.  d', a measure of sensitivity, reflects the degree of overlap between signal 
(e.g. the distribution of responses to old items) and noise (e.g. the distribution of responses to 
new items) distributions, with less overlap reflecting greater sensitivity.  It is expressed as 
standard deviation units between the means of the signal and noise distributions (MacMillan & 
Crellman, 2005; Stanislow & Todorov, 1999).  There are a number of measures of response bias 
in SDT.  Though, the likelihood ratio, β, is often reported (Stanislow & Todorov, 1999), research 
suggests that criterion c may be a better measure of response bias because it is less affected by 
changes in d’ (MacMillan & Crellman, 2005; Stanislow & Todorov, 1999).  Criterion c is the 
distance between the response criterion set by the participant and the neutral point where neither 
response is favored (e.g., the point in which the signal and noise distributions intersect) 
expressed in standard deviation units.  d' and c were calculated on an excel spreadsheet using 
formulas described by Sorkin (1999).   Because d’ and c cannot be calculated when hit or false 
alarm rates are equal to either 1 or 0, an adjustment for such values must be made.  The loglinear 
adjustment was employed as this adjustment has been shown to yield less biased results than 
more traditional adjustment methods (Miller, 1996).  
3. Results 
3.1 Social anxiety, Anxiety, and Depression 
 Table 1 also displays participants’ scores on the BAI, BDI-II, SPS, and SIAS.  Group by 
condition ANOVAs demonstrate that there were no differences between conditions on the SPS, 
F (1, 73) = .03, p = .87, or SIAS, F (1, 73) = .22, p = .64. or the BDI-II, F (1, 73) = 2.25, p = .14, 
though there was a trend for participants in the low-importance condition to have higher scores 
the BAI, F (1, 73) = 2.88, p = .09, η2 = .04.  As expected, HSA participants scored significantly 
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higher than did LSA participants on the SPS, F (1, 73) = 97.93, p < .0001, η2 = .57, the SIAS, F 
(1, 73) = 46.80, p < .0001, η2 = .40, the BDI-II, F (1, 73) = 4.00, p = .05, η2 = .05, and the BAI, F 
(1, 73) = 6.05, p = .02, η2 = .08.  Unexpectedly, there was a significant condition by social 
anxiety group interaction on the BAI, F (1, 73) = 6.51, p = .01, η2 = .08.  Interactions were not 
significant for the BDI-II, F (1, 73) = .54, p = .47, SPS, F (1, 73) = .63, p = .43, or the SIAS F (1, 
73) = 1.06, p = .31.  LSA participants in the high-importance condition scoring significantly 
lower on the BAI than the other three groups.  
3.2 Integrity Check 
 Group by condition ANOVAs were conducted for the integrity check question to assess 
the degree to which each group believed that their physiology was being monitored by the 
computer.  There was no significant difference in the degree to which participants believed that 
their physiology was being monitored between conditions, F (1, 73) = 1.8, p = .18, or between 
social anxiety groups, F (1, 73) = .003, p = .96, nor was there an interaction between condition 
and social anxiety group, F (1, 73) = .10, p = .76.  Participants generally indicated that they 
moderately believed that their physiology was being measured (M = 37.17, SD = 28.67).   
3.3 State Anxiety 
 To establish that the performance task provoked anxiety, a 2 (high-importance vs low-
importance) x 2 (HSA vs LSA) x 3 (baseline vs. pre-performance vs. post-performance) 
ANOVA was calculated with state anxiety as the dependent variable.  State anxiety in HSA 
participants (M = 47.69, SD = 24.31) was significantly greater than state anxiety in LSA 
participants (M = 31.37, SD = 26.57), F (1, 73) = 15.28, p < .0001, η2 = .17.  There was also a 
significant main effect of time, F (2, 146) = 4.38, p = .01, η2 = .06.  Participants reported 
significantly more anxiety just prior to the speech, (M = 46.41, SD = 25.57) than at baseline (M = 
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39.22, SD = 24.60) or just after the speech (M = 39.63, SD = 26.58).  There was no significant 
difference in state anxiety between the two conditions, F (1, 73) = .20, p = .66, n.s., nor were 
there any significant interactions, Fs < 1.00.  Thus, HSA participants were indeed more anxious 
than LSA participants, though increases in anxiety in response to the speech were not 
significantly different between the HSA and LSA groups. 
3.4 Memory for Stimuli Associated with Physiological Response 
As a result of unexpectedly lower BAI score in the high-importance LSA group, the BAI 
was entered as a covariate for subsequent analyses.  The BDI-II was also entered as a covariate 
for subsequent analyses to account for the higher scores on this measure observed in the HSA 
compared to the LSA group. Mixed-factorial ANCOVAs with condition (high-importance vs. 
low-importance) and social anxiety group (HSA vs. LSA) as the between-participant factors, and 
stimulus type (increasing vs. decreasing vs. stable) as the within-participant factor were 
calculated for separately for each memory variable.   
3.5 Free Recall 
 Free recall scores for each group and condition are displayed in Table 2.  For recall, there 
was a significant main effect of condition, F (1, 71) = 4.52, p = .04, η2 = .06.   Table 2 
demonstrates that participants in the high-importance condition recalled a significantly higher 
percentage of images than participants in the low-importance condition.  None of the other main 
effects (e.g., for group and stimulus type) were significant nor were any of the interactions, Fs < 
.87. 
3.6 Recognition 
 Results for recognition are presented in Table 3.  We first examined the hits and false 
alarm rates.  For hit rate, the main effect of condition approached significance, F (1, 71) = 5.17, p 
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= .03, η2 = .07.  Participants in the high-importance condition had a higher hit rate than 
participants in the low-importance condition.  None of the other main effects or interactions 
approached significance, Fs < 1.91.   
 For false alarms, there was a significant main effect of condition, F (1, 71) = 4.67, p = 
.03, η2 = .06.  Participants in the high-importance condition made fewer false alarms than 
participants in the low-importance condition.  There were no other significant main effects or 
interactions, Fs < 1.22. 
 d’ was examined to determine if the differences observed for hits and false alarms were 
due to greater sensitivity in the high-importance condition.  The main effect of condition was 
significant, F (1, 71) = 9.10, p = .004, η2 = .11.  Participants in the high-importance condition 
were more accurate overall than participants in the low-importance condition.  None of the other 
main effects were significant, Fs < 2.11, nor were any of the two-way interactions, Fs < .56. 
However, the hypothesized condition x social anxiety group x stimulus type interaction nearly 
reached traditional levels of significance, F (2, 142) = 2.83, p = .063, η2 = .04.  Though within 
each condition HSA and LSA participants did not differ from each, pairwise comparisons of 
condition within each level of social anxiety did reveal that HSA and LSA participants 
responded differently to the high and low importance conditions.  In the HSA group, participants 
in the high-importance condition were significantly more accurate than participants in the low-
importance condition in recognizing increasing items, F (1, 71) = 4.90, p = .03, η2 = .07, but not 
decreasing, F (1, 71) = 1.01, p = .32, or stable items, F (1, 71) = 2.14, p = .15.  In contrast, in the 
LSA group, participants in the high-importance condition were significantly more accurate than 
                                                 
3 Given that the three-way interaction between importance condition, social anxiety, and stimulus type, the main 
analysis of interest, was near but did not reach a traditional level of statistical significance, a post-hoc power 
analysis was conducted to determine if one explanation for the near significant finding for d’ could be a lack of 
power in the statistical design.  Power was revealed to be .55. 
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participants in the low-importance condition in recognizing stable items, F (1, 71) = 8.65, p = 
.004, η2 = .11, and non-significantly more accurate in recognizing decreasing items, F (1, 71) = 
2.64, p = .09, η2 = .04, but not increasing items , F (1, 71) = .002, p = .96.  
3.7 Response Bias 
 c was examined to determine if there were differences in response bias between the two 
conditions.  Results for c are also presented in Table 3.  None of the main effects or interactions 
were significant, Fs < 1.67. 
4. Discussion 
 This study examined whether self-focused attention coupled with a negative 
interpretation of bodily sensations would result in a memory bias for images representing those 
sensations.  The relationship of these processes to social anxiety was also assessed.  We 
predicted that individuals who interpreted changes in bodily sensations as being important to 
their performance would remember more stimuli associated with changes in physiology during a 
false feedback performance task compared to individuals who interpreted changes in bodily 
sensations benignly.  We further anticipated that this memory bias would be amplified in 
individuals reporting high social anxiety.   
Results were partially consistent with predictions.  Individuals in the high-importance 
condition did not just remember more stimuli associated with changing physiology, but 
remembered more stimuli overall compared to individuals in the low-importance condition.  This 
was apparent in both measures of recall and recognition accuracy.  Importantly, this result could 
not be attributed to differences in response bias between the two conditions. 
 Though we anticipated that individuals in the high importance condition would remember 
stimuli associated specifically with changing physiology, we actually found that such an 
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interpretation enhances memory for all stimuli.  Unfortunately, because we did not test general 
memory ability, it is not possible to rule out the possibility that by chance, participants in the 
high-importance condition simply had better memory capabilities than participants in the low-
importance condition.  However, the random assignment of participants combined with the fact 
that participants in each condition did not significantly differ in level of education achieved 
makes the possibility of general memory differences unlikely.  Furthermore, results cannot be 
adequately explained by differences in the degree to which participants believed the computer 
false feedback as there were no differences between the groups on our integrity check.  Future 
investigators may wish to replicate this study to confirm that these factors did not in fact 
influence the findings. 
 The general enhancement of memory for information concerning one’s physiological 
response among participants in the high importance condition needs to be explained.  
Participants in the high importance condition were told that they should expect to see 
information consistent with stable physiology if they are giving a good speech.  Information 
concerning what to expect regarding their physiological response should they give a good speech 
may not have primed them to attend to information about giving a poor speech but rather simply 
primed them to additional information that would be relevant to the self evaluation of their 
performance, in this case all information about their physiology. 
 Expectations concerning their performance, rather than expectations concerning their 
physiological response may have determined the type of information concerning their physiology 
to which they attended.  The importance manipulation differentially influenced the accuracy with 
which different stimuli types were recognized depending on the participants’ level of social 
anxiety, though this finding only approached statistical significance.  Among high social anxiety 
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participants, holding the belief that one’s physiology should be stable if giving a good speech 
resulted in greater recognition accuracy of stimuli associated with increases in physiological 
response compared holding the belief that one’s physiology is unrelated to performance.  In 
contrast, among low social anxiety participants, the belief that physiology should be stable if 
giving a good speech resulted in greater recognition accuracy of stimuli assoicated with stable 
and to some extent decreasing physiological response compared to the belief that physiological 
response is unrelated to performance.   
One explanation for these findings is that individuals with high social anxiety tend to 
remember threat cues of threat whereas individuals with low social anxiety tend to remember 
cues of safety under social conditions.  That is low socially anxious participants showed 
enhanced memory for cues that their performance is going well and that they are perhaps even 
relaxing (e.g., that their physiology was stable and possibly decreasing), whereas high socially 
anxious participants showed enhanced memory for cues that their performance is going poorly -- 
that their physiological response is not only changing, but increasing.  The idea that low social 
anxiety is associated with enhanced processing of safety whereas high social anxiety is 
associated enhanced processing of threat or danger is consistent with studies demonstrating that 
individuals with social anxiety attend to negative social information and interpret ambiguous 
stimuli negatively, whereas individuals with low social anxiety attend to positive information 
and interpret ambiguous stimuli more positively (Breck & Smith, 1983; Constans, Penn, Ihen, & 
Hope, 1999; Gilboa-Schechtman, Franklin, & Foa, 2000; Perowne & Mansell, 2002; Veljaca & 
Rapee, 1998;). 
Another explanation for these findings is that individuals with and without social anxiety 
have different self-regulatory strategies.  Self-regulation theories suggest that different self-
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regulatory strategies can lead to different response behaviours (Carver & Scheier, 1998).  
Individuals may set a goal to achieve and work towards reducing the discrepancy between their 
current state and desired goal.  Other individuals may set a standard to avoid and work at 
increasing the discrepancy between their current state and the standard to be avoided.  Better 
memory for information concerning stable physiology may reflect discrepancy reducing 
strategies among low socially anxious participants, whereas better memory for information 
concerning increasing physiology may reflect discrepancy increasing strategies among high 
socially anxious participants.  This interpretation is consistent with the idea that avoidance 
discrepancy strategies result in anxiety (Carver, Lawrence & Scheier, 1999) and consistent with 
cognitive models of social anxiety that propose that the core of social anxiety is a perceived 
discrepancy between standard s/he believes the audience has and perceived performance (Clark 
& Wells; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). 
 These explanations, however, should be considered in light of two important factors.  
First, the three-way interaction was only a trend.  Further analysis revealed that the power of the 
analysis was lower than traditionally accepted levels, suggesting that the sample size was most 
likely too small to detect the differences at appropriate levels of significance.  Unfortunately due 
to the median split design it was difficult, if not impossible, to control the number of participants 
with high and low social anxiety in each importance condition.  Secondly, differences between 
importance conditions within each social anxiety group were apparent only on the recognition 
memory task, whereas the differences in memory between the importance conditions was 
apparent on both recall and recognition.  This is likely due to the fact that d’ accounts for both 
hits and false alarms combined.    
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In addition to the limitations described above, it is important to note other limitations of 
this study.  HSA participants scored significantly higher on the BDI-II.  Though social anxiety 
and indeed most types of anxiety are often associated with greater depression, it would be 
beneficial to our understanding of memory in social anxiety to examine memory in a group of 
socially anxious participants who do not report elevated levels of depression, in order to be 
confident that differences observed between groups are due to social anxiety rather than 
depression.  Unexpectedly, participants in the high-importance low social anxiety group had 
significantly lower BAI scores than participants in the other groups.  We attempted to control for 
these differences statistically.  Given these limitations, replication of findings, perhaps using a 
clinical sample, is warranted.   
 Despite these limitations, this is one of the first studies to attempt to assess memory for 
internal sensations using an ecologically valid paradigm.  Memory for these internal sensations 
was assessed indirectly (e.g., via the type of image associated with each type of physiological 
information).  Though assessing memory indirectly may have potentially reduced our power to 
detect such associations, we were still somewhat successful in detecting a memory bias.  Some 
models of emotion processing that suggest people with anxiety show enhanced attention 
followed by avoidance of threat (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997).  In traditional 
tests of memory for threat information, individuals with high anxiety may not state that they 
recall or recognize threat material because of the strong desire to avoid this material, potentially 
reducing the ability of researchers to detect a memory bias.  In fact, animal studies assessing fear 
memory often use avoidance as an indicator of memory and learning (Levine & Pizarro, 2004).  
By assessing memory for threat indirectly, anxious participants may be less likely to avoid target 
stimuli and therefore increase the ability of researchers to detect memory biases.   
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 Should findings from this study be replicated in a clinical sample this will suggest that 
memory biases in SAD may be functionally related to other information processes biases 
associated with SAD.  Specifically self-focused attention coupled with interpretations about the 
meaning of one’s internal sensations may interact and result in enhanced memory for internal 
sensations of arousal.  These memories may in turn contribute to negative images of the self 
(Hackmann et al., 2000; Hackmann et al., 1998).  It may therefore be particularly important for 
cognitive behavioural therapists to focus on modifying beliefs about the self and reduce the 
degree of self-focused attention engaged in during social interactions.  This is consistent with 
current cognitive-behavioural treatments for SAD (Clark et al., 2003) and may help to reduce 
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Demographic characteristics, social anxiety, general anxiety, and depression of participants 
 









n  17 23 22 15 
% Female  76 83 91 93 
Level of educationa      
    % University  6 35 10 27 
    % Pre-university college  82 52 80 53 
    % Highschool  12 13 5 20 
     % Elementary school  0 0 5 0 
Age      M 22.06 22.41 24.30 22.13 
 SD 2.51 3.97 4.52 2.23 
SPSb M 22.65 x 21.15 x 6.00 y 6.93 y
 SD 8.29 9.24 3.21 3.79 
SIASc M 22.82 x 26.70 x 15.43 y 14.00 y
 SD 12.94 9.44 10.31 9.85 
BDI-IId M 10.82 x 12.32 x 5.52 y  9.87 y
 SD 8.35 11.29 3.93 8.61 
BAIe M 16.18 x 14.64 x 7.13 y 14.80 x
 SD 10.99 7.51 4.24 8.14 
Note. Means with differing subscripts are significantly different from each other at p < .05. 
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a Participants were asked to indicate their highest level of education attained.  The large 
proportion of participants reporting having completed college is explained by the fact that 
residents of Quebec are required to attend college prior to starting university. 
b Social Phobia Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998). 
c Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998). 
d Beck Depression Inventory – II (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). 
e Beck Anxiety Inventory (Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer,1988). 
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Table 2. 
Percentage of correctly recalled stimuli associated with increasing, decreasing, and stable 
physiological response, after controlling for differences in age, depression and anxiety.a 
  High Social Anxiety Low Social Anxiety 
  High-importance Low-importance High-importance Low-importance
Increasing M 12.94x 10.00y 10.40x 10.67y 
 SD 12.13 6.90 7.67 7.99 
Decreasing M 14.71x 10.91y 12.61x 7.33y 
 SD 13.75 9.71 7.52 5.94 
Stable M 12.94x 9.55y 15.22x 9.33y 
 SD 12.13 8.44 12.38 11.00 
a Columns with differing superscripts indicate that there was a significant difference between 
those groups at p < .05.
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Table 3 
Percentage of hits, and false alarms during recognition for stimuli associated with increasing, 
decreasing and stable physiology. a 









Hits      
Increasing M 65.20x 55.30y 66.30x 70.56y 
 SD 17.74 22.79 25.56 18.33 
Decreasing M 68.14x 59.85y 67.03x 62.78y 
 SD 19.60 19.86 19.38 23.12 
Stable M 72.06x 59.85y 71.38x 57.22y 
 SD 13.48 21.15 15.86 19.38 
False Alarms      
Increasing M 21.08x 32.58y 27.90x 33.89y 
 SD 16.17 17.61 15.61 22.60 
Decreasing M 26.96x 28.79y 24.28x 36.11y 
 SD 16.54 18.50 16.27 23.29 
Stable M 33.82x 33.33y 27.90x 35.00y 
 SD 25.08 16.86 17.15 20.70 
d'      
Increasing M 1.38x, z .70y 1.21x 1.11y 
 SD .86 .78 1.03 .93 
 36
Decreasing  M 1.26x .95y 1.32x, z† .84y 
 SD .85 .81 .83 .80 
Stable M 1.15x .81y 1.33x, z .63y 
 SD .70 .77 .70 .79 
Criterion c      
Increasing M .24 .19 .07 -.09 
 SD .37 .49 .49 .49 
Decreasing M .06 .18 .13 .02 
 SD .41 .45 .42 .58 
Stable M -.08 .09 .02 .13 
 SD .57 .44 .44 .47 
a Columns with differing superscripts indicate that there was a significant difference between 
those groups at p < .05.  † indicates that the column with different superscript is different at p < 
.10. 
